Eunsun Kim

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Education

University of California, Los Angeles, Ph.D. in Quantitative Marketing — Expected 2027

Duke University, M.S. in Economics and Computation — 2021

Seoul National University, M.S. in Quantitative Marketing — 2019

Seoul National University, B.A. in Business — 2017
summa cum laude; Minor in Economics

Research Interests

Quantitative Marketing, Empirical Industrial Organization, AI and Algorithmic Pricing

Job Market Paper

Following to Lead: Dominant Followership in Sequential Price Competition

I study how algorithmic price responses reshape competition when firms differ in demand advantage and response reliability. Using synchronized high-frequency cross-platform pricing data, I find that Amazon, despite being the dominant platform, stands out as an effective follower. I investigate this strategy, which I call dominant followership, as a mechanism through which demand asymmetry can raise prices. A sequential Bertrand model modified to break ties in favor of the dominant firm explains why this mechanism can be incentive-compatible: with a majority of demand at price parity, the dominant firm may prefer to match rather than undercut because matching lets it monetize its existing customer base. Anticipating this response, the rival can profitably initiate price increases that would otherwise be difficult to sustain. Prices rise above the simultaneous-move Nash equilibrium level only when the two asymmetries coincide: the demand-advantaged firm must also be the reliable responder. When pricing is delegated to adaptive algorithms, the same demand and timing asymmetries shape not only current pricing incentives, but also what rivals learn from market feedback over time. In Q-learning simulations, price increases emerge through learning in the rival's algorithm, yet most of the surplus accrues to the dominant firm. The main insight of this paper is that algorithmic price competition among asymmetric firms should be modeled as a sequential response process: when demand asymmetry changes response incentives, individually incentive-compatible pricing decisions can soften competition without explicit coordination.

Working Papers

Can Consumer AI Discipline Algorithmic Pricing?

This project studies whether consumer-side AI shopping agents can weaken dominant-platform pricing power in markets where firms use pricing algorithms. Many consumers begin product search inside a dominant platform and compare only a limited set of alternatives, allowing firms to benefit from search frictions and default position. AI shopping agents can change this environment by searching across platforms, tracking recent price histories, and making price and non-price tradeoffs easier to compare. However, lower search costs need not eliminate platform advantage, because consumers may still value the dominant platform's non-price advantages, such as delivery speed, return convenience, and trust. I model consumer-side AI as lowering search frictions and expanding consumers' consideration sets, which reduces the dominant firm's demand advantage. Starting from a market in which the dominant platform captures a large share of demand, I ask how pricing incentives change as AI agents make consumers more willing to consider rival sellers. The main exercise is a threshold analysis: how much must the dominant firm's demand advantage fall before the dominant-followership mechanism breaks down? I then examine the implications for consumer welfare. The project speaks to a policy question in algorithmic pricing: whether consumer-side AI can discipline dominant platforms through better search, or whether dominant-platform advantages are too persistent for the market to self-correct.

Honors and Research Grants	AMA-Sheth Consortium Fellow	2026
	NBER Digital Economics and AI Tutorial	2025
	Haring Symposium Fellow	2025
	ISMS Doctoral Consortium Fellow	2023, 2025
	Price Center for Entrepreneurship and Innovation Research Grant	2024
	Grand Prize, Mock Fair Trade Commission Contest, Korea Fair Trade Commission	2017
	Dean's List, Seoul National University Business School	2015, 2016
Presentations	**Following to Lead: Dominant Followership in Sequential Price Competition**	
	Industrial Organization Proseminar, Department of Economics, UCLA	2025, 2026
	World Congress of the Econometric Society (ESWC)	2025
	ISMS Marketing Science Conference	2025
	Artificial Intelligence in Management (AIM) Conference	2025
Discussions	Haring Symposium	2025
	California Quantitative Marketing Ph.D. Student Conference	2023, 2024
Teaching Experience	Teaching Assistant, UCLA Anderson School of Management	2022–present
	Customer Assessment and Analytics (MBA elective), Brett Hollenbeck, Robert Zeithammer	
	Data and Decisions (MFE course), H. Tai Lam	
	Statistical Foundations for Data Analytics (MSBA course), Peter Rossi	
	Teaching Assistant, Department of Computer Science, Duke University	2021
	Everything Data	
	Graduate Assistant, Center for Data and Visualization Sciences, Duke University	2020
	Teaching Assistant, Seoul National University Business School	2018–2019
	Data-Driven Marketing Analytics	
	Marketing Management	
Past Employment	Mobile Market Research Team, LG Display	2017
	Intern, Corporate Law Team, Barun Law LLC	2015
Programming	Python, R, MATLAB, C++, LaTeX	

REFERENCES

For letters of recommendation, please contact amy.corrales@anderson.ucla.edu.

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